Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
4 Ibid.
Franks were keenly aware of the failure of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and did not want to repeat that failure. They agreed that the force would have to be small, flexible, and possess the capabilities to operate with precision and lethality. 6 CENTCOM directed its Special
Operations Command (SOCCENT) to begin planning. SOCCENT in turn notified the 5th
Special Forces Group to begin preparations to conduct UW in Afghanistan.
Operation Enduring Freedom saw SF take an unprecedented role as the main effort in the campaign to overthrow the Taliban and root out al-Qaeda. The unconventional war fought in Afghanistan involved working by, with, and through the Northern Alliance to achieve strategic, operational and tactical objectives. The Northern Alliance, under the advisement and direction of SF, served as a surrogate army in place of the large conventional U.S. force that Rumsfeld and Franks wanted to avoid using. SF's success in Afghanistan would foreshadow what was to come a year later in Iraq.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, SF was employed on an even larger scale. When the 4th
Infantry Division was not allowed to enter northern Iraq through Turkey, the 10th Special Forces
Group was used to open up a second front with surrogate forces. Kurdish militia, which numbered approximately 70,000, were used by SF to disrupt 13 Iraqi divisions, preventing them from interfering with the Combined Forces Land Component Command's (CFLCC) march on Baghdad.
In both OEF and OIF, U.S. Army Special Forces demonstrated they could leverage a surrogate force to achieve U.S. objectives. The use of surrogates in Afghanistan allowed the Bush administration to achieve the quick response desired after the attacks of September11th.
The use of surrogates also reduced U.S. presence, gave the local population a stake in the coalition's objectives, and bolstered the perception of legitimacy for a U.S.-led coalition. In northern Iraq, the use of surrogates served to fill the large void created by Turkey's refusal to allow U.S. forces to enter Iraq through their country and proved to be a suitable substitute for the large U.S. conventional force that was originally planned for the northern front.
IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE
Since it's inception in 1952, SF's niche has been UW. The recent experience of OEF and OIF validates this. Nevertheless, the unconventional warfare campaigns SF conducted in Afghanistan and northern Iraq were unique. This was not guerilla warfare characterized by small units using hit and run tactics. This was positional warfare in which cities were taken, ground was held, and the enemy capitulated or defeated. The Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga functioned as surrogate armies in place of U.S. conventional forces and they were controlled by U.S. Army Special Forces. The success SF achieved in Afghanistan and northern Iraq has established a trademark for UW in the 21st century.
METHODOLOGY

In answering the primary research question of what is required of U.S. Army Special
Forces to prepare for surrogate warfare in the future; this monograph will examine history, theory and doctrine. Analysis of the U.S. Army's use of Indian scouts on the western frontier and OSS Detachment 101's use of Kachin tribesmen in Burma during World War II will demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of using surrogate forces. The theories of T.E. Lawrence and Sun
Tzu will provide an understanding of the importance of understanding culture and of knowing one's own strengths and weaknesses, as well as the value of the indirect approach to waging war.
Analysis of current unconventional warfare doctrine will offer insight to how surrogate warfare might fit into the overall UW framework.
This monograph will also examine two historical vignettes from the recent UW operations in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The first historical vignette will examine Task Force Dagger in Afghanistan and the UW operations they conducted with Northern Alliance Forces. The second historical vignette will examine Task Force Viking in northern Iraq and the UW operations they conducted with Kurdish Peshmerga forces.
Two criteria will be used to analyze and evaluate the historical vignettes presented in this monograph. The first criterion is training, and focuses on the cultural awareness and regional expertise required to conduct surrogate warfare. Analysis will reveal the challenges SF faced in working with surrogates and the steps they took to overcome these challenges. Analysis will also reveal that SF is indeed the force of choice for conducting surrogate warfare because they possess regional specialization and language capabilities.
The second criterion is organization, and focuses on the ability of a Special Forces Group to serve as an operational level headquarters capable of conducting an unconventional warfare campaign. Analysis will reveal the challenges both the 5th and 10th Special Forces Groups faced and the steps they took to overcome personnel, logistics, and planning issues.
CHAPTER TWO: Understanding Surrogate Warfare
HISTORY
The use of surrogate forces by the U.S. Army is not a new concept. One need only look to the Indian Wars of the western frontier where Indians were used by the U.S. Army to fight other Indians. The Indians had a long tradition of serving the U.S. Army as guides, but in 1866
the War Department authorized the use of up to 1,000 Indians to be officially commissioned as scouts. 7 General George Crook was one of the main proponents of using Indian scouts. In his efforts to track down renegade Indian bands, he employed Indian scouts alongside his regular troops, but he also employed them independently. Crook understood the nature of the war against Indians was different from conventional warfare, and the only way he could be successful was by using Indians himself.
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Using Indians as a surrogate force to achieve their objectives, the U.S. Army was able to adapt to the environment in which they were operating. By embracing the very characteristics of the Indian that had once confounded them, the Army was able to compensate for their own weakness by leveraging the strengths of another. Besides the obvious advantages that Indian scouts brought to the U.S. Army, such as knowledge of the land and cultural nuances of the Indians, they also provided significant human intelligence. Additionally, there were never more than 120 Americans in the field in Burma at a time.
Consequently, Burmese nationals were recruited to perform these tasks, thereby becoming surrogates for the Americans.
10 Ibid.,8. 11 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (California: Presidio Press, 1986), 206. 12 James R. Ward, The Activities of Detachment 101 of the OSS (1942 OSS ( -1945 , online at www.oss-101.com/history. Accessed 2 October 2004.
When Detachment 101 was formed, the Army did not have any doctrine or guidance on recruiting, training and employing native forces. The leaders in Detachment 101 figured it out as they went along. Members of the Detachment also received training from the natives. The Kachin tribesmen were fierce fighters who lived in the hills and they trained their American advisors how to survive and fight in the jungles. As Detachment 101 evolved and the surrogate army grew, they began to rely more and more on airborne operations. They began infiltration via parachute, rather than overland travel, and they learned how to conduct resupply operations by air in the jungle. They also began developing tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting rescue operations for downed aircrew. By the beginning of 1944, Detachment 101 had grown to 3,000 men and by 1945 they would be over 10,000 strong.
Detachment 101 and their Kachin tribesmen had many important roles in the war. They provided valuable intelligence to conventional American and Allied forces and they served as a vital economy of force effort in the theater. Detachment 101 was responsible for killing 5,428 Japanese soldiers, wounding an estimated 10,000 and capturing 78 prisoners. Detachment 101 losses were only 27 American and 338 natives killed. 13 The American use of surrogates in Burma was a huge success and proved equally successful in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bedouin surrogates. U.S. Army Special Forces have been described as "PhD's with guns." SF understands the importance of continually studying their region, language, and the culture of the people with whom they work. It is through a process of life-long learning that SF is able to achieve cross-cultural expertise that allows them to achieve U.S. objectives through unconventional means. With respect to conventional operations, current doctrine says that unconventional warfare can be used to either augment or reduce U.S. forces required to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Interestingly, doctrine says the way to do this is by developing and sustaining surrogate forces and synchronizing their activities with the U.S. and their allies.
THEORY
DOCTRINE
Again, the term surrogate is used in a different context that is not consistent with the previous definition. Clearly there is a need to accurately define what a surrogate force means and the warfare conducted by surrogates. But, before this can be done it is necessary to further examine unconventional warfare doctrine.
To gain a better understanding of how surrogate warfare might fit into the doctrinal framework of UW, it is useful to examine the seven "classic" phases of UW as put forth in current doctrine. The figure below comes from FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, and lays out each of the seven phases of UW. Normally it takes months to plan and execute a UW campaign. However, the phases do not necessarily have to be conducted sequentially, some may be conducted concurrently or not at all, and not all phases are given the same level of effort. 19 All UW campaigns are unique, as the OEF and OIF historical vignettes will show later in this paper. Obviously, there are many advantages to having a surrogate force that is indigenous to a region.
DEFINING SURROGATE WARFARE
They have inherent knowledge of the terrain, people and culture. They also may lend legitimacy to the operation because they are not viewed as outsiders.
In his essay Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force, Brian L. Thompson defines a surrogate army as "a military arm that is integrated into the joint force requirements, but is not specifically a part of the joint force." 21 He contends that surrogate armies provide the President and Secretary of Defense a force option if they choose not to use a U.S. military force. The problem with this definition is that sometimes using a surrogate force is the only option available.
For the purposes of this paper a surrogate force is defined as any force that acts on behalf of another and surrogate warfare is any operation that involves using a surrogate force as the primary means to accomplish the mission. 
CHAPTER THREE: Task Force Dagger -Afghanistan
Once the decision was made to go to war with Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks were not going to occupy Afghanistan with a large army.
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The Soviet's had occupied Afghanistan from 1979-1989 and their 625,000-man army became embroiled in a difficult and costly counterinsurgency.
While the Department of Defense was figuring out how it was going to come up with a military response to 9/11, the CIA had a plan to conduct a covert operation to overthrow the Taliban. Prior to 9/11 the CIA had been conducting operations in Afghanistan and had 
THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE
The Northern Alliance was an anti-Taliban opposition group consisting of a loose conglomeration of several different ethnic tribes that included the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the Hazaras. The southern Pashtun tribes, which represent the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan, were not a part of the Northern Alliance, but they also were opposed to the Taliban regime. The two indigenous leaders the 5th SFG had identified as potential partners in their UW campaign were Mohammed Fahim Khan and General Rashid Dostum. Khan had succeeded Ahmad Shah Massoud, as the senior military leader of the Northern Alliance. Massoud, known as the "Lion of Panjshir", had led the mujahideen fight against the Soviet Union. He was assassinated just two days prior to 9/11. General Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, had served in the Soviet army and fought against the mujahideen until he switched sides and joined Massoud to fight against the communist puppet regime in Afghanistan. Dostum had formed his own militia, which was approximately 10,000 to 15,000 strong.
Many Northern Alliance members got their start as mujahideen fighting against the Soviets. During the Soviet's ten-year occupation, the mujahideen ran an effective insurgency, but the Soviets adapted to the situation by effectively using air power to fight the insurgents. In the mid-eighties, however, the mujahideen regained the advantage when the CIA provided them with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, effectively neutralizing Soviet air power. 34 The lesson learned from the Soviet's experience in Afghanistan was that large conventional forces are ineffective in restrictive terrain against a determined enemy. 
INFILTRATION AND LINK-UP
MAZAR-E SHARIF
Mazar-e Sharif, the second largest city in Afghanistan, was of significant cultural, religious and economic value to the Northern Alliance. The U.S. was also interested in Mazar-e While the SF teams were directing precision air strikes to reduce Taliban defensive positions, the Northern Alliance commanders were negotiating with Taliban commanders. This is a common practice in Afghanistan, where it is customary to switch sides and change allegiances.
While some Taliban commanders took up the offer, others were determined to resist at all costs.
Many of these die-hard fighters were foreigners and had ties to al-Qaeda. These non-Afghan forces tended to be better trained and equipped, and they fought the hardest against the Northern Alliance. 
A FRIENDSHIP IS FORMED
THE KURDS
The situation in northern Iraq had improved considerably since the Gulf War. Under the protection of Operation Northern Watch (ONW), the successor to Operation Provide Comfort II, the Kurds prospered. In 1998 the two main political parties, the KDP led by Massoud Barzani and the PUK led by Jalal Talabani, put aside their differences and agreed to share power. The 
INFILTRATING NORTHERN IRAQ
Turkey continued to confound the situation by refusing to allow the U.S. overflight rights. The initial infiltration into northern Iraq, dubbed "Ugly Baby," took a circuitous route from Constanta, Romania, over the Mediterranean Sea, down to Jordan, then across the western desert of Iraq just below the Syrian border into Bashur airfield. U.S. Air Force Special Tactics teams had already established airheads at Bashur airfield and As-Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq.
On 22 March, the Special Operations Combat Talon MC-130's flew under Iraqi air defenses.
Still, they came under heavy fire and several aircraft were damaged. One aircraft carrying an entire SF company was severely damaged and was forced to conduct an emergency landing in Turkey. 61 Turkey granted overflight rights the next day.
Task Force Viking continued to infiltrate their forces via their MC-130s. Because of the distance from Romania, restrictions imposed by the Turks, and the remaining air defense threat, only one infiltration per night was feasible. This required task force planners to modify the plan, balancing the infiltration of ODAs with supplies. Because of the limited lift capacity of the MC-130 and the lack of C-17 support, the build up of combat power occurred slower than desired.
Despite these challenges, the task force's MC-130s performed admirably, successfully infiltrating all of Task Force Viking in a matter of weeks.
OPERATION VIKING HAMMER
The first order of business for Task and surrogate assets. In the southern portion of the JSOA, the 3rd Battalion, 10th Group with their PUK forces attacked to seize Chamchamal, pushing Iraqi forces to the outskirts of Kirkuk.
In the center, the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Special Forces Group, along with elements of the 2nd During a meeting between the task force commander, his battalion commanders and the KDP and PUK leadership, the PUK contingent began celebrating about the fall of Kirkuk. The KDP leader, Barzani, left the meeting in anger. 71 The KDP were concerned about the PUK making a grab for Kirkuk, a city both factions wanted. In response to this, the task force commander gathered up the PUK and KDP leaders and retired them to a private room, away from their lieutenants, where he proceeded to lay out the campaign plan. He explained to them how they each were contributing to the campaign and that if either of them wished to have a role in a post-Saddam Iraq, then they had better watch how they conducted themselves. By taking the time to explain the significance of the campaign in the north, the task force commander was able to defuse the situation while at the same time enrolling them into his vision for the conduct of the campaign.
The second criterion has to do with the organization of the Special Forces Group and their ability to serve as an operational-level headquarters that can plan, support and execute a UW campaign. Like the 5th SFG the 10th SFG was directed to form a JSOTF, an operational-level joint headquarters, not a tactical level SFOB or ARSOTF. Although they initially lacked the personnel, communications equipment, and training to run a joint headquarters, the biggest difference between the experience of 10th SFG and 5th SFG was time.
Task Force Viking had significantly more time to prepare to become a JSOTF. They not only had the benefit of the lessons learned by 5th SFG in Afghanistan, they also had the Additionally, much of the necessary equipment required to run a JSOTF has been acquired.
However, a SFG still only forms the nucleus of a JSOTF and as such the SFG staff needs time to bring all of the other joint and combined participants together to train prior to deploying.
Another operational-level issue Task Force Viking faced was logistics. Because of a lack of strategic airlift, Task Force Viking was forced to rely solely on their MC-130s for infiltrating personnel and supplies. As Task Force Viking built combat power in northern Iraq, they had to constantly balance what supplies were pushed forward. For example, initial heavy fighting along the Green Line required the task force to push forward more .50 caliber ammunition and Javelin anti-tank missiles at the expense of food, water and other requirements. To help alleviate the logistical strain, the task force relied on the Kurds for much of their initial logistical requirements.
The Kurds were very helpful in providing everything from lodging, sustenance, and vehicles. In this regard, the Kurds proved to be more than just good fighters, but gracious hosts who provided critical life support to the task force as they built up combat power during the early days of the war. 72 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 54. The second criterion, organization, was used to assess the ability of a Special Forces
CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion and Recommendations
Group to function as an operational-level joint headquarters. Analysis of the experience of the 5th and 10th Special Forces Groups revealed that while they successfully accomplished their missions and established Joint Special Operations Task Forces, there were significant growing pains. The primary reasons for this were a lack of equipment, personnel and training. Much of the required equipment has now been acquired and there is increased institutional knowledge within the Special Forces Groups with respect to operating a JSOTF. However, there will always be a requirement to bring the army, joint and combined personnel together in a timely manner to train as JSOTF prior to deploying.
The unconventional warfare campaigns SF waged in Afghanistan and Iraq were unique and established a trademark for UW operations in the 21st Century. Because of the cultural divide that currently exist between eastern and western cultures, the use of surrogates abroad may become increasingly more attractive. U.S. Army Special Forces are clearly the force of choice to leverage surrogates to achieve U.S. objectives. In order to prepare for future surrogate warfare SF must increase their cultural and regional expertise. SF must also be better able to function as an operational-level joint headquarters that can plan and support a UW campaign.
